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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

s

WILLIAM ROBERT CUMMINS,

I

Case No. 900419-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of second degree
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203 (Supp. 1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990),
because the case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court on
August 31, 1990.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did defendant preserve his claim of prosecutorial

misconduct for appellate review?

Generally, a contemporaneous

objection is required before an appellate court will review a
claim on appeal.
1989).

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah

A motion for mistrial after the conclusion of closing

argument does not serve as a contemporaneous objection which
preserves an issue for review.
(Utah 1978).

State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 555

Alternatively, did the statements of the prosecutor

constitute plain error which this Court should review in spite of
the waiver?

The two prong test of plain error is 1) whether the

error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 2) whether
the error was harmful.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35

(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by the

manner in which a private investigator was provided for defendant
and by denying defendant's request to appoint a psychiatrist to
assist in his defense?

A request for appointment of an

investigator is to be addressed first to the county; if the
county refuses to act, defendant can seek a writ of mandamus in
court for appointment.

Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6,

447 P.2d 189, 192 (1968).
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion for continuance?

The granting of a motion to continue is

within the discretion of the trial court.

State v. Creviston,

646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982).
4.

Did trial counsel provide constitutionally

effective assistance to defendant?

To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that his
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced him.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984).
5.

Did the trial court properly instruct and guide the

jury as to the points of law pertinent to this case?

The trial

court has the duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to
the facts of the case.
1981).

State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah

The framing of instructions lies within the trial court's

discretion.

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988).

-2-

6.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by the

manner in which it allowed the jury to conduct its deliberation?
The length of time for jury deliberations is discretionary with
the trial court.

State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App.

1988).
7.

Did the trial court correctly refuse to allow the

jury to view the crime scene?

The decision to allow jurors to

view a crime scene lies in the sound discretion of the trial
court.

State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 746 (1945).
8.

case?

Does the doctrine of cumulative error apply in this

The cumulative error doctrine does not apply when no

substantial errors were committed in the trial.

State v. Rammel,

721 P.2d 498, 501-502 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 27, 1989, defendant and three co-defendants
were charged with second degree murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1990) (Record
[hereafter R.] at 2 and 6). On November 1, 1989, defendant filed
a motion in the circuit court for appointment of a private
investigator to assist in preparation of his defense (R. at 1416).

The circuit court denied that motion on November 3, 1989,

on the basis that defendant had not complied with the procedure
for appointment mandated in Washington County v. Day, 447 P.2d
189 (Utah 1968) (R. at 24).
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Counsel was appointed for defendant; defense counsel
filed a motion for discovery on November 10, 19891 (R. at 3436).

Preliminary hearing for the four defendants was held

December 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1989 (R. at 73 and 78-133).

The

charge against defendant was bound over to the trial court, which
set a scheduling conference on January 3, 1990 (R. at 135 and
137).
On January 10, 1990, defendant waived his right to a
speedy trial, and trial was set for February 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9,
1990.

All motions were to be filed by January 12, and a

transcript of the preliminary hearing was to be provided to
counsel as soon as possible (R. at 141) • Also on January 10,
counsel for this defendant filed a motion to continue the trial,
claiming that discovery had not been completed and that the
private investigator (which evidently had been provided by that
time) and counsel needed more time to investigate and prepare for
trial (R. at 146-48).

The motion was denied on the grounds,

inter alia, that there had been an extensive preliminary hearing,
that defendants were in custody, and that the witnesses were
transient and their continued presence to testify might be
jeopardized by a continuance (R. at 156-57).

On January 16,

1990, defendant filed an objection to the trial setting (R. at
183).

1

The motion appears to have been signed on October 10;
however, the crime did not occur until October 25. The order
granting the motion was signed by the court on November 13.
Apparently, the typewritten month on counsel's signature line is
in error; the typewritten month in the certificate of mailing was
corrected.
-4-

Defendant filed a motion on January 16, 1990, to allow
psychological testing and evaluation regarding his ability to
form the intent required for second degree murder (R. at 185)•
That same day, he filed a motion for appointment of a
psychiatrist to determine if he "had the capacity to form the
necessary intent", a toxicologist to determine the amount of
marijuana present in the victim's blood, an expert to determine
defendant's blood alcohol content, and a doctor to assist in
interpreting the medical examiner's report (R. at 187-88).
Several other documents were also filed that day, including a
notice of intent to claim lack of capacity to form intent (R. at
189-200).
At hearings held on January 18, 1990, defendant argued
that the jury should be transported to the crime scene to view it
(Transcript of hearing 1/18/90 involving defendant and codefendant Cabututan at 3-4). This motion was denied (R. at 23638).

On January 19, 1990, the court granted defendant's motion

for expert testimony regarding defendant's level of intoxication
and the effects thereof, even though the court noted that it was
filed untimely (R. at 239-40).
The matter came on for jury trial on February 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9, 1990, in the First Judicial District Court, in and for
Box Elder County, State of Utah, with the Honorable F. L.
Gunnell, district judge, presiding (R. at 294-98).

At the

conclusion of trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged
(R. at 298 and 368-69).

On February 20, 1990, the court
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sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah
State Prison (R. at 293 and 370-72).
After trial, counsel filed a notice of appeal, and
defendant sent a pro se request to the trial court asking that
substitute counsel be appointed to pursue his appeal (R. at 375
and 394). On August 10, 1990, the court appointed substitute
appellate counsel for defendant (R. at 407).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In October of 1989, the Western Brine Shrimp Company
had established a camp for its workers on the west side of the
Great Salt Lake, in the Hogups area at Fingerpoint (Transcript of
trial [hereafter Tr.] at 454 and 112). There were three small
living trailers at the camp which were numbered from one to three
(north to south) for purposes of trial (Tr. at 74).

Richard

Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Sherman Galardo lived in trailer #1
(Tr. at 112). Eddie Apodaca, Ray Cabututan, and Michael or
Miguel Ramirez stayed in trailer #2 (R. at 86-87).

Defendant

stayed in trailer #3 with Billy Cayer and Don Brown (Tr. at 87
and 455).
On October 25, 1989, Eddie Apodaca and Richard Anderson
spent the day building an outhouse north of the camp (Tr. at 85).
Apodaca had worked at the camp for a couple of months prior to
that day; Anderson had worked there four or five weeks (Tr. at 85
and 111). Defendant and Cayer had worked at the camp for
approximately two months (Tr. at 455).
for two days (Tr. at 457).

Ramirez had worked there

On October 25, Don Brown spoke with

defendant about purchasing alcohol or drugs while Brown was in
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Salt Lake City, delivering shrimp eggs (Tr. at 457). Defendant
asked Brown to bring him a half gallon of Jack Daniels whiskey
(Tr. at 458).
When Brown returned to the camp at approximately 7:30
p.m., he brought a 12-pack of beer with six beers missing, a half
gallon of vodka, and a half gallon of whiskey (Tr. at 459-60).
Even though there was a rule against alcohol in the camp,
defendant and some of the others began drinking (Tr. at 460-69).
At approximately 9:00 p.m., Betty Bentzley, one of the owners of
the brine shrimp company, radioed the camp to check on the
workers.

Defendant answered the radio and spoke with Ms.

Bentzley, assuring her that everything was fine at the camp, that
all the men were in the trailers, and that no one was drinking
(Tr. at 442). Ms. Bentzley only asked whether anyone was
drinking as a joke; nothing about defendant's voice made her
suspicious that he was drinking (Tr. at 443).
It was dark at 9:45 p.m. when defendant approached the
second trailer and asked Apodaca to go with him back to trailer
#3 (Tr. at 87-88).

Defendant had heard that Apodaca had

marijuana and defendant wanted to offer Apodaca alcohol in
exchange for marijuana (Tr. at 466).

The victim, Mike Ramirez,

who was in trailer #2 when defendant approached Apodaca, asked
Apodaca if he wanted to borrow Ramirez's knife. Apodaca thought
he would not need it and walked over to trailer #3. Defendant,
Brown, Cayer, and Cabututan were drinking and talking together in
trailer #3 when Apodaca entered (Tr. at 89).

The four men were

drinking alcoholic beverages and defendant gave Apodaca a "sip"
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of a mixture of kool-aid and vodka (Tr. at 90-91 and 465-67 )•
Apodaca was accused of usurping the foreman's authority and of
not helping Cabututan, and a "scuffle" ensued (Tr. at 90-91).
Cabututan hit Apodaca a couple of times and knocked him back on
the bed; he then hit Apodaca on the head with a sharpening stone.
When Cabututan reached for a broom, Apodaca ran out the door of
the trailer.

As he left trailer #3, the victim, Ramirez, stepped

out of trailer #2 (Tr. at 91).
Apodaca and Ramirez entered trailer #2, where Apodaca
changed his clothes.
might happen."

He "didn't want to hang around, something

Meanwhile, defendant, Brown, Cayer, and Cabututan

broke into the trailer; Cabututan was carrying a pair of
nunchukas (Tr. at 92-93).

Ramirez stepped between the four and

Apodaca, "trying to hold them back."

Defendant told the others

that Ramirez had a knife in his back pocket and the four of them
backed Ramirez up between the beds in the trailer.

At that

point, Ramirez pulled out his knife and Brown also pulled a knife
(Tr. at 94).

Brown talked Ramirez into dropping his knife; then

the three of the men grabbed Ramirez and dragged him from the
trailer (Tr. at 95-96).

Cayer, who was intoxicated, stayed in

the trailer, hitting and kicking Apodaca.

Apodaca could hear

Ramirez being beaten (Tr. at 96-97).
After a few minutes, Brown returned to the trailer,
told Cayer to stop hitting Apodaca, and told Apodaca to get his
things and leave the camp. Apodaca gathered some belongings and
left the trailer (Tr. at 96).

Outside, he saw Ramirez lying on

the ground and "a blur of people standing around him, kicking

-8-

him" (Tr. at 97).

Apodaca started to run away between two of the

trailers when defendant asked him if he was not going to stay and
help his buddy.

Apodaca stopped, and as he turned around,

defendant hit him in the jaw, knocking him to the ground (Tr. at
97-98).

From the ground, Apodaca looked under the trailer and

saw Ramirez lying on the ground (Tr. at 98).

When Apodaca stood

up, defendant ran behind him and Cabututan came at him with a
crescent wrench.

Apodaca began running north (Tr. at 98). As he

ran, he heard defendant tell Cabututan to let him go.

Defendant

said, "Let's finish this guy [Ramirez]" or words to that effect.
Apodaca continued running, glancing back to see a group of people
surrounding Ramirez who was still on the ground (Tr. at 99).
Apodaca spent the night huddled near a bush far from the camp
(Tr. at 100). In the morning, he walked to the road and was
picked up by Richard Anderson and returned to the camp where the
sheriff's deputies had arrived (Tr. at 100-101).

He was dazed

and disoriented from being struck and spending the night in the
cold (Tr. at 105 and 244).
Richard Anderson was in trailer #1 with Eric Tilley and
Sherman Galardo when he heard the commotion outside the trailer.
He got up, put on his clothes and opened the door (Tr. at 114).
Just before he looked out, he heard someone say something like,
"['L]eave this cam[p] before we kill you['] and [']leave this
camp with what you got on[']" (Tr. at 115). When he looked out,
he saw four men standing around another on the ground (Tr. at
114-15).

They were "beating on the man, kicking the man,

whatever they could to hurt the man at the time."
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Defendant was

participating in the beating and kicking with the others (Tr. at
116).
The doors of trailers #1 and #2 were open, which let
out enough light that Anderson could see what was happening.
Anderson saw defendant, Cabututan, Brown, and Cayer pick up
Ramirez, beat him, let him fall to the ground, and kick him.
Ramirez pleaded for them to stop but they continued.

After a few

minutes, Cayer left but the other three continued to assault
Ramirez (Tr. at 117). Anderson, Tilley, and Galardo did not go
out to help Ramirez because they did not know where Cayer was and
they felt in danger (Tr. at 118, 134 and 136). At one point,
defendant held Ramirez up as Cabututan appeared ready to stab
Ramirez.

Galardo told Cabututan that he did not want to do that;

Cabututan turned on Galardo.

Brown raised a crescent wrench and

swung it at Anderson, asking if he "wanted some of this, too";
Anderson stepped back into the trailer (Tr. at 118).
Anderson saw defendant choking and beating Ramirez in
the face, saying, "['Y]ou shouldn't have cut my partner Billy.
I'm going to beat you for this.[f]"

(Tr. at 119). At one point,

someone said, "[']He's not breathing.[']

And then another . . .

voice said that, '[W]ell, things like that happen.

He's just a

spic [sic]'" (Tr. at 120). At another point, Anderson heard
defendant say that he was going to kill Ramirez for "cutting
[his] partner" (Tr. at 121). Defendant appeared to be doing most
of the beating and appeared to be directing the others (Tr. at
151-52).
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When the men stopped beating Ramirez, Ramirez got up,
went to the water barrel, and went into his trailer to clean
himself up. At about midnight, after things had settled down,
Anderson looked out and saw defendant sitting on a vehicle as if
he was watching over the camp (Tr. at 123). At about 2:30 a.m.,
Brown approached the trailer where Anderson and Galardo were and
said,

,f

[']You old boys didn't see anything last night, did

you.['J"

Anderson told him that he had not seen anything because

Anderson feared for his life (Tr. at 122-23).

Defendant and

Brown returned to trailer #3 and sat at a table, drinking (Tr. at
124).
Tilley had left the trailer, carrying a steak knife and
a sleeping bag, before Brown came to the door (Tr. at 125 and
161).

He thought it was safer to leave the camp and he spent the

night on a plateau behind the camp (Tr. at 161). Anderson stayed
awake all night, watching the trailer door in case any of the
four men returned (Tr. at 125). At about 5:00 a.m., Anderson was
sitting on the edge of his bunk when he heard a rapping at the
door.

Outside the door was Ramirez, sitting on a pallet; he

looked up and asked Anderson to call 911 (Tr. at 125). Ramirez
told Anderson and Galardo that he could not breathe and that he
needed water.

Galardo handed him a glass of water, which he

drank, then he fell over backward on the pallet.

Both Anderson

and Galardo checked him for pulse and respiration; when they
found none, Anderson and Galardo got in a truck and drove to the
nearest telephone at Lakeside.

They remained at the town until

the Sheriff's office called and told them that the campsite was
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secure and asked them to return (Tr. at 126). Returning to the
campsite, they found Apodaca about ten miles from the camp,
wandering in the desert. When they got back to the trailers,
Anderson saw a knife next to Ramirez's body which had not been
there when they left to telephone the authorities (Tr. at 127).
An autopsy conducted on Ramirez's body showed "multiple
injuries on essentially all body surfaces" (Tr. at 346). The
cause of death was listed as multiple blunt force injuries (Tr.
at 353). There were multiple contusions and abrasions, and
bruising and scraping of the skin.
wounds (Tr. at 346-47).

There were stab and incise

Bruising on his face and head was

consistent with having been struck with a crescent wrench (Tr. at
347-52).

Bruising on his neck and petechiae in both eyes was

consistent with choking and asphyxiation (Tr. at 352-53).
Internal examination revealed that Ramirez's brain had
swollen until it "essentially tried to push itself out of the
bottom of the skull" (Tr. at 353). There was hemorrhaging at the
base of the brain and in the muscles of the neck.
a pint of blood was free in the chest cavity.

Approximately

There were

multiple rib fractures, anterior and posterior and on both sides
(Tr. at 354). The swelling of the brain was caused by blows to
the head, choking, and an inability to inhale deeply because of
the pain of the broken ribs (Tr. at 359-60).
Defendant testified that he began drinking at
approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 25, 1989 (Tr. at 460 and 499).
First he drank a 12-ounce can of beer, then he drank a glass of
vodka (Tr. at 461). The glass was between a third and half full,
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which, defendant thought, was four or five ounces of alcoholic
beverage (Tr. at 463-64).

He testified that he then drank four

or five glasses (about one-third to one-half full) of whiskey
before he went to confront Apodaca (Tr. at 465). When Apodaca
entered defendant's trailer, defendant gave him defendant's
drink, then pulled out a coffee cup and filled it half full with
whiskey (Tr. at 467-68).
Defendant remembered the scuffle in trailer #3 between
Apodaca and Cabututan (Tr. at 469). After Apodaca left, Cayer
wanted to fight Cabututan, but defendant intervened.

Cayer "was

all drunk" and began "ranting and raving about something."

Cayer

"flew out the door," and Cabututan, then defendant, followed him
(Tr. at 470). They found Cayer in trailer #2, trying to fight
Apodaca (Tr. at 471-73).

Defendant restrained Cabututan from

using nunchukas and told Ramirez that he was going to remove
Cayer from the trailer (Tr. at 474-75).

When Brown entered the

trailer, Brown told Ramirez to put his knife down.

As Ramirez

looked toward Brown, defendant hit Ramirez in the side of the
face (Tr. at 475). Ramirez fell on a bunk, defendant jumped on
him and punched him four or five more times; Ramirez had a bloody
nose and lip.

Ramirez struggled to get up and ran out the door

(Tr. at 476).
Defendant got Cayer out of the trailer and heard
scuffling sounds outside (Tr. at 477-78).

Apodaca came out of

the trailer and exchanged words with defendant and defendant
punched him (Tr. at 480).

After chasing Apodaca a short

distance, defendant walked around the trailer and saw Ramirez
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lying face down on the ground, moaning and half conscious (Tr. at
481-82).

As defendant tried to pick him up, "someone come [sic]

and kicked him in the face." After someone kicked Ramirez,
defendant pushed down on him, pushing his head in the dirt and
said, "[D]on't kick him" (Tr. at 483-84).

Defendant walked

Ramirez to his trailer and told him to lie down.

Ramirez sat on

the bed and defendant returned to his own trailer and had another
drink (Tr. at 484). Defendant does not remember anything more
until he awoke the next morning (Tr. at 485). He explained that
the blood found on the clothing he had been wearing might have
gotten there when he punched Ramirez in trailer #2 or when he
helped Ramirez up after he had been beaten (Tr. at 486).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant did not preserve his claims of prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument because he did not interpose an
objection to the comments at the time they were made.
Alternatively, although defendant alludes to plain error, he has
failed to fully analyze this claim under that doctrine.

Even if

the proper analysis had been made, defendant has not shown that
the prosecutor's comments were error or that there was a
reasonable likelihood of a different result had the statements
been objected to and stricken.

By his own testimony, defendant

claims that he did not participate in the beating of the victim.
The eyewitness testimony was to the contrary.

These two distinct

evidentiary options for the jury to accept decreases the
possibility that the jury would have been influenced by the
prosecutor's remarks.
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The record demonstrates that defendant was provided
with the services of an investigator long before the trial court
actually signed an order appointing the investigator.

Not only

did defendant have the services of an investigator, he also has
not demonstrated how an earlier appointment could have provided
any more assistance to the preparation of his case.
Defendant's request for appointment of a psychiatrist
was not made in a timely fashion and the trial court properly
denied the motion.
Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced
by the court's denial of his motion for continuance.

Counsel had

been on the case since defendant was first charged and had had
two and a half months before filing his motion to prepare for
this case.

He had another twenty-five days after the motion to

continue was denied to continue to prepare.

Defendant has not

shown that the matters he needed to review and complete could not
have been accomplished in the time given.
Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by
filing an untimely motion for appointment of a psychiatrist
because a psychiatrist could not assist in the defense that
defendant raised by his own testimony.

Neither could a

psychiatrist assist given the paucity of evidence of defendant's
supposed intoxication.

There is no evidence that counsel did not

adequately prepare for trial or that his cross-examination was
deficient.

Defendant has also failed to show how a failure to

call character witnesses prejudiced his defense.

Finally,

defendant has not alleged how counsel's failure to object to
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prosecutorial statements in the closing argument prejudiced him;
consequently, he has not demonstrated ineffective assistance by
his trial counsel.
The trial court responded to the questions submitted by
the jury during their deliberation in an appropriate fashion when
the court referred the jury to other instructions which would
answer the questions they posed.
Allowing the jury to deliberate until 1:20 a.m. was not
coercive and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or of due
process.

The jury did not ask to retire from deliberation and

showed by the questions they sent out that they were giving due
consideration to the instructions and the evidence.

When the

jury was polled after the verdict, each juror affirmed that the
verdict was his or hers individually.

Defendant has not shown

that he was deprived of the "considered judgment of each juror."
The jury had the benefit of diagrams and photographs of
the crime scene; consequently, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a motion to allow the jury to visit the
scene.
Because no substantial errors were made at trial, the
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIMS OF
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT.
WHETHER PRESERVED OR NOT, THE STATEMENTS BY
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT CONSTITUTE
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor committed
prejudicial error in closing argument.

None of the nine specific

instances which defendant cites as error have been preserved for
appellate review.
"A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court recordbefore an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal."
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in
original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)).

After closing arguments were completed, the jury retired

to deliberate (Tr. at 669). It was not until after this point
that defendant moved for a mistrial on the two bases that the
prosecutor had implied that defendant and Cabututan had conspired
to fabricate their testimonies, and that the prosecutor had
called defendant a criminal (Tr. at 669-71).2

In State v.

White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that
a motion for mistrial after the jury had retired to deliberate
did not preserve White's claims for review.
2

The court said:

Contrary to defendant's statement in his brief (Brief of
Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 33), the court did not deny
the motion for mistrial and give his reasons therefor in front of
the jury. The jury had retired when defendant made his motion
and the judge denied it (Tr. at 669-71).
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Defense counsel made no objection at that
time [during the prosecutor's rebuttal], but
after the jury had retired to deliberate,
included that as a ground for a motion for a
mistrial. . . . If counsel d€*sires to object
and preserve his record as to such an error
during argument, he must call it to the
attention of the trial court so that if he
thinks that it is necessary and appropriate
to do so, he will have an opportunity to
rectify any error or impropriety therein and
thus obviate the necessity of an entire new
trial.
Id. at 555 (footnote omitted).

Of the nine claims of

prosecutorial misconduct stated by defendant, seven were never
raised in the trial court, and two were only raised in the motion
for mistrial after the jury had retired.

For the reason of

failure to object alone, this Court should decline to review
defendant's claim.
In some, but not all, of the specific claims of
misconduct, defendant alludes to plain error; however, he
provides little specific legal and factual analysis of the plain
error doctrine in the specific allegations.

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990) requires that "th€* argument
section of a brief 'contain the contentions of the [party] with
respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor, with
citations.' . . . A brief must contain some support for each
contention."

State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989)

(emphasis in original).

See also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that

lf

[c]ounsel

for both sides have 'considerably more freedom in closing
argument' and 'a right to discuss fully from their standpoints
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the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom.'"

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)

(quoting State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988)
(quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426
(1973)).

In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the

Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent
the misconduct.'"

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988)

(citations omitted).

Analysis of the alleged errors in closing

argument will be conducted under the standards enunciated in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct and under the plain
error standard.
A.

Analysis under the first prongs of the
prosecutorial misconduct test and the plain error
doctrine.

In his introduction to point I, defendant cites
generally to the two-pronged plain error test. As enunciated in
State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110
S.Ct. 62 (1989), that test is 1) whether the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and 2) whether the error was
harmful, i.e., whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result had the error been corrected.

The second prong

is the same as the second prong of the test for prosecutorial
misconduct stated above.
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As noted above, defendant moved for a mistrial after
closing argument based on two statements allegedly made* by the
prosecutor in argument.

The trial court denied the motion,

stating that both statements were
logically extensions of . . . the facts of
this case. If he murdered a man, he's a
criminal. I think the allegation is that he
committed a murder, and I interpret the
argument as being that for them to find that
he is a criminal. As far as them getting
together, they were together the whole night
after the incident, had an opportunity to
talk about the case. I don't know that there
is any evidence that they did so, but
certainly that's a reasonable inference for
what they were doing with their time during
that period of time and in the morning as
well before the law enforcement people got
there. So I just find that to be a logical
— or an argument made from some facts that
were before the court, so I will deny that
motion.
(Tr. at 671).

Defendant analyzed the claim that the prosecutor

"stigmatized'• defendant by calling him a criminal under the plain
error test.

However, he does not cite to the record for the

alleged error, other than to defense counsel's statement in the
motion for mistrial.

Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746

P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Uckerman v.
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978))
("This Court need not, and will not, consider any facts not
properly cited to, or supported by the record").

This Court

should decline to consider this claim because of defendant's
failure to cite to the record, as well as his failure to object.
Defendant next claims error because the prosecutor
implied that defendant and Cabututan had "[c]onspired [t]o
[f]abricate" their testimony (Br. of App. at 35). Defendant
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argues that when the remarks regarding this issue were made "the
trial court should have, at a minimum, immediately sustained an
objection" (Br. of App. at 36). However, defense counsel did not
interpose an objection; consequently, the court could not sustain
one (Tr. at 628-35).

Defendant does not analyze this claim as

plain error and this Court should decline to review it.
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor expressed his
opinion that defendant was not telling the truth, and that the
error in that argument should have been obvious to the trial
court.

Defendant does not analyze the second prong of the plain

error test. While it may be improper for a prosecutor to express
his personal belief or opinion of the truthfulness of testimony,
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 23.5(b) at 34 (1984), defendant
must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different result
had the statements not been made.

This prong of the test will be

addressed further in subpoint B.
The next claim is that the prosecutor erred in
informing the jury that Cabututan had been convicted of second
degree murder in his own trial.

Cabututan did not testify at

defendant's trial; as an unavailable witness, his testimony from
the preliminary hearing was read into the record (Tr. at 575613)*

As with any other witness, Cabututan could be and was

impeached by his felony conviction.
Evidence.

Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of

In closing, the prosecutor referred to Cabututan's

conviction, not "as proof of Appellant's guilt" (Br. of App. at
39), but in terms of Cabututan's credibility and motive to be
untruthful (Tr. at 634-35).

This was proper comment on
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Cabututan's impeachment by his felony conviction; it was not
error.
Defendant next complains that the prosecutor
erroneously compared the evidence in defendant's case with other
cases.

His only legal analysis is a reference to "the Miranda

court" with no citation to that case. Without telling this Court
what specific Miranda case he is referring to, defendant equates
the prosecutor's comments in the present case with "similar
comments . . . alluding to the fact that the co-defendant had
been convicted on much weaker evidence than the evidence
introduced against defendant" (Br. of App. at 41).

Whatever case

defendant is referring to, it clearly is not on point with the
present case.

The case referred to involved statements about a

co-defendant being convicted on weaker evidence.

The

prosecutor's comment in the present case did not compare this
case with the trials of the co-defendants; the comment merely
stated that the evidence in this case included eyewitnesses,
physical evidence, and expert testimony (Tr. at 668).
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor did
not misstate the evidence about defendant's intoxication.

The

prosecutor correctly stated that the testimony of Apodaca,
Anderson, Tilley, and Ms. Bentzley did not include that defendant
was "staggering" or exhibited "slurred speech" (Tr. at 667). As
defendant notes, Apodaca, in response to defense counsel's
question whether defendant was "quite drunk" when he approached
Apodaca, said that defendant did not "seem quite drunk" to the
witness (Tr. at 103). In the context of Anderson's perception of
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the dangerousness of defendant and the other assailants, defense
counsel asked if he felt they were dangerous because they were
drunk.

Anderson responded that he "guess[ed] so" (Tr. at 136).

When counsel asked if all four were "pretty drunk," Anderson
answered, "My opinion, yes" (Tr. at 140). Tilley thought the
defendants "had been drinking" (Tr. at 160). Later, defense
counsel asked Tilley if the defendants were "quite drunk," and
Tilley responded that he assumed that they had been drinking
because they had drunk on the job before (Tr. at 173). Ms.
Bentzley testified that defendant spoke "very clear[ly]" when she
spoke on the radio with him at 9:00 p.m. (Tr. at 442-43).

Just

as the prosecutor stated, these witnesses had not testified that
they had noticed "any staggering, slurred speech, anything like
that" (Tr. at 667). The inference from the three on-site
witnesses's testimony was that they thought that defendant had
been drinking or may have been drunk but there was no testimony
that defendant was not moving in a normal fashion.

The

prosecutor's statements were not a misstatement of the testimony.
The statement that the defendant would prefer being
convicted of something less than second degree murder came in the
context of suggesting that the jury look at the murder jury
instruction before contemplating the lesser offense instructions
(Tr. at 661-62).

Defendant cites a Pennsylvania case as

analogous to this comment but does not demonstrate how this case
makes the prosecutor's statement obvious error (Br. of App. at
43).

The jurors's common sense would tell them that a person

would prefer to be convicted, if at all, on a lesser charge.
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The

prosecutor was merely stating the obvious, he was not disparaging
a legitimate defense strategy.
Defendant next cites two comments by the prosecutor
which he states "were specifically calculated to cause jury
prejudice and as a result, it is argued, they too constituted
error" (Br. of App. at 43).

No analysis of the impropriety of

these remarks is presented and this Court should decline to
address those comments. Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344.
Defendant maintains that the prosecutor vouched for the
credibility of Anderson.

A reading of the transcript cites

provided in this point shows that the prosecutor's comments were
in reference to consistency between the testimony of Anderson and
the other evidence.

Many of the citations do not have any

reference to Anderson's testimony.

Defendant has not shown that

the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of Anderson.
B.

There is no reasonable likelihood of a different
result had the prosecutor's statements been
objected to and disregarded.
Under either the plain error test or the prosecutorial

misconduct test, defendant must show prejudice.

Even if all of

the statements defendant complains of w€>re improper, there simply
is no reasonable likelihood that the improper remarks so
prejudiced the jury that there would have been a more favorable
result for defendant in their absence.

There was substantial

testimonial and physical evidence of defendant's guilt.

See

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) ("'If proof of
defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark
will not be presumed prejudicial'").
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The eyewitness testimony was that defendant joined in
kicking and beating Ramirez outside the trailer; in fact/
defendant seemed to be directing the beating (Tr. at 116-21 and
151-52).

Defendant was heard threatening to beat and to kill

Ramirez (Tr. at 119-21).

Defendant testified that he struck the

victim five or six times while they were in trailer #2 (Tr. at
475-76).

He claimed that he was chasing Apodaca and heard only

"scuffling" when Ramirez was being beaten outside of the trailer
(Tr. at 477-81).

When next he saw Ramirez, Ramirez was on the

ground, half conscious, and defendant tried to help him up (Tr.
at 482-83).

Someone else kicked Ramirez and defendant told them

not to (Tr. at 483). Defendant did push down on Ramirez as he
told the kicker to leave Ramirez alone, but then defendant helped
Ramirez up and walked him to his trailer (Tr. at 483-84).

In

State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court
faced a similar situation and said:
As we have pointed out earlier, this
record contains substantial evidence of
defendant's guilt. His primary theory at
trial appears to have been that someone else
committed the crime . . . . The jury was free
to accept or reject that theory in its
entirety. Because the two options were so
distinct, this is not a case where the
evidence presented a close question or
offered several possible constructions of
ambiguous evidence. The possibility that the
jury would be influenced by the prosecutor's
reference to irrelevant factors in his
closing statement was therefore greatly
diminished.
Id. at 1112. The jury was given two distinct options about
defendant's involvement in Ramirez's death.

As in Smith, the

evidence was not ambiguous and the jury was not likely to have
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been overly influenced by the prosecutor's closing statement.
Defendant's final claim is that if none of the errors
he alleges were reversible errors, their cumulative impact
constituted reversible error. A similar argument was rejected in
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-502 (Utah 1986), when the
supreme court held that the cumulative €>rror doctrine does not
apply when no substantial errors were committed.

As argued

above, the errors claimed by defendant either were not errors at
all or were not prejudicial; consequently, taken together they do
not constitute cumulative reversible error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR BY THE TIMING OF ITS APPOINTMENT OF AN
INVESTIGATOR OR BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF A PSYCHIATRIST TO
ASSIST IN HIS DEFENSE.
Defendant alleges that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel, a fair trial, due process, or equal
protection by the court (Br. of App. at 47).

He addresses a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a separate point;
that issue will also be addressed separately by the State.
Defendant claims a general violation of his right to
fair trial, due process, and equal protection under both the
federal and state constitutions.

He has not analyzed the claim

separately under the state constitution; consequently, this Court
should not review the claim as a separate state constitutional
issue.

See State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah

1988).

Defendant has divided this issue into two subpoints; the

first is that the trial court "belatedly" appointed an
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first is that the trial court "belatedly" appointed an
investigator for defendant.
A.

Appointment of an investigator.

The second is that the trial court erred in not
appointing a psychiatrist to assist in his defense.

Defendant

asserts that "belated" appointment of an investigator was a
violation of his right to a fair trial and due process (Br. of
App. at 49-50).

The legislature has determined that

[t]he following are minimum standards to be
provided by each county, city and town for
the defense of indigent persons in criminal
cases in the courts and various
administrative bodies of the state:

(3) Provide the investigatory and other
facilities necessary for a complete
defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990).

The Utah Supreme Court

explained the identical predecessor of this statute in Washington
County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (1968).

In that case,

the court said:
When counsel has once been appointed, he
can petition the county to appoint an
investigator; and in case of a refusal to
act, counsel can then bring a writ of
mandamus in court, and the court can after
hearing the matter determine if an
investigator should be appointed and can
order the commissioners of the county to make
an appointment.

[However,] the law requiring an
investigator as one of the minimum
requirements does not contemplate an
investigator unless there is some reasonable
basis to justify an investigator spending
time and incurring expenses.

-27-

(1972), the supreme court held that a denial of Cote's
application for appointment of an investigator was not
prejudicial to his rights.

There was no showing that the

information Cote thought an investigator would find would have
aided in his defense.
As indicated by the statutory provision for
investigatory assistance and by the Day case, an investigator is
not automatically appointed.

Defendant must show a

"particularized need" for an investigator.
Procedure, § 11.2(d) at 5 (Supp. 1990).

LaFave, Criminal

"Establishing sufficient

need for a special investigator appears to be especially
difficult, perhaps because it is assumed that investigation of
the facts is ordinarily within the expertise of counsel."
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 11.2(d) at 26 (1984) (footnotes
omitted).
The record demonstrates that defendant made an oral
motion on October 31, 1989, and filed a written motion for
appointment of investigator in the circuit court on November 2,
1989 (R. at 10 and 14-16).

The county attorney filed a response,

citing the Day and Cote cases, and alleging that defendant had
failed to follow the procedure outlined in JDay in requesting the
appointment (R. at 19-23).

In a decision signed November 3,

1989, the circuit judge determined that defendant had not
complied with Day, and declined to appoint an investigator (R. at
24).

The next record mention of an investigator is on November

20, 1989, with a clerk notation, "Trying for Private
Investigator" (R. at 66). Defendant's preliminary hearing was
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held December 19-22, 1989 (R. at 7 and 78-124).

Nothing was

noted in the record of the preliminary hearing about appointment
of an investigator.
Defendant was arraigned in the district court on
January 2, 1990; again no mention of an investigator appears in
the record (R. at 137). At a scheduling conference on January
10, 1990, defendant was given until January 12, 1990, to file all
motions (R. at 141). Also on January 10, defendant filed a
motion for continuance; in the body of that motion, defendant
refers to "the private investigator appointed in this matter" (R.
at 147). In a response filed January 10 to the motion to
continue, the deputy county attorney indicated that
"investigators were appointed weeks ago" (R. at 152). Finally,
on January 17, 1990, the court signed a written order appointing
an investigator in this case; the court appointed the same
investigator which had been appointed "in a related case" (R. at
197).
At a hearing on motions, held January 18, 1990, the
deputy county attorney referred to a hearing held "several weeks
before the arraignment . . . which was sort of an appeal from the
circuit court, . . . where the defendants . . . said we need an
investigator because we have witnesses we want to interview"
(Transcript of Cabututan hearing 1/18/90 at 40 3 ).
3

Two hearings were held on January 18, 1990, one involving
Cabututan and his counsel, Quinn Hunsaker. The second hearing
involved defendant and his counsel, Jack Molgard. Mr. Molgard
incorporated the arguments of Mr. Hunsaker and the court issued
the same rulings in defendant's proceeding as had been issued in
Cabututan's proceeding (Transcript of Cummins hearing 1/18/90 at
10-24).
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While the record does show the initial request for an
investigator occurring on November 3, 19 89, and the written
appointment being signed January 17, 1990, the actual length of
time between the request and the appointment of an investigator
apparently was shorter than that.

If, as directed by the circuit

court ruling on November 3, 1989, defendant approached the county
for an investigator, the provision of that investigator may not
appear in the record.

From defendant's motion to continue, the

State's response and the statements in the January 18 hearing, it
appears that an investigator was provid€*d to all four defendants
well before the district court signed the order for an
investigator provided by Mr. Molgard.
Even if the court had been remiss in timely appointing
an investigator, defendant has not shown prejudice by the fashion
in which the investigator was provided.
Utah 2d 24, 492 P.2d 986, 987 (1972).

See

State v« Cote, 27

Defendant alleges that

there were discrepancies between the versions of the incident
given by the eyewitnesses and defendant.

Consequently, he

maintains, "it was necessary to the preparation of an adequate
defense that a private investigator be appointed to assist in
interviewing the witnesses; to point out inconsistences to the
witnesses, and attempt to decipher the truth prior to the
preliminary hearing" (Br. of App. at 52).

It is difficult to see

how an investigator was "necessary" to point out inconsistencies
between statements to the witnesses.

Defense counsel was given

the statements and was able to discern the inconsistencies.
would have been accomplished by pointing out the alleged
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What

inconsistencies to the witnesses?

How would an investigator have

been any more capable of "decipher[ing] the truth prior to the
preliminary hearing" than counsel?

By pointing out the

inconsistencies between the statements, would an investigator
have been able to convince any of the witnesses to change their
versions of the event?

If he had, counsel would then have been

free to impeach the witnesses with the change in their own
statements in addition to using the inconsistencies between the
statements of the different witnesses at trial. An investigator
could have done no more than defense counsel could in finding the
inconsistencies before trial; only counsel was in a position to
use those inconsistencies at trial.
Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to
question the witnesses before preliminary hearing because after
the testimony is given at that proceeding, it is "cast in stone"
(Br. of App. at 52).

He does not allege that he was denied

access to the witnesses; nor does he indicate why the statements
given by the witnesses before preliminary did not serve the same
function of setting their versions in stone.
Defendant next contends that an investigator could have
taken photographs of the crime scene prior to the preliminary
hearing to be shown to the witnesses to help them remember what
they had seen (Br. of App. at 53).

The exhibit list of the

preliminary hearing demonstrates that photos of the scene were
introduced into evidence and evidently were available for the
purpose defendant cited for their use (R. at 125-33).
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Defendant

does not indicate why these photographs were not sufficient for
his purposes.
Defendant also says he was restricted because his
investigator did not obtain information regarding the victim's
background and any violent nature of the victim or witnesses. He
claims that this was necessary because defendant contends he was
acting in self-defense; however, at trial, defendant never
claimed that he acted in self-defense.

Defendant testified that

he hit Ramirez in the trailer when Ramirez's attention was drawn
to Brown (Tr. at 475). Defendant said that he only heard
scuffling when Ramirez was being beaten; defendant merely helped
Ramirez up after the beating and helped him to his trailer (Tr.
at 476-78 and 482-84).

This defendant has never claimed that he

struck Ramirez in self-defense; consequently, he did not need an
investigator to bolster that defense.
B.

Appointment of a psychiatrist.

Defendant maintains that he should have been allowed
the assistance of a psychiatrist to determine whether he had the
requisite mental state to be convicted of second degree murder.
In point II, defendant argues this subpoint as a denial of due
process and as a denial of the effective assistance of counsel.
The assistance of counsel claim is raised again in point IV; the
State will address that issue in the subsequent point.
On January 16, 1990, defendant filed a motion to allow
psychological testing and mental evaluation (R. at 185); a motion
for appointment of court appointed experts, including a
psychiatrist to determine defendant's capacity to form the
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"necessary intent", a toxicologist to determine amount of
marijuana in the victim's blood, an expert to determine the level
of alcohol in defendant's blood, and a medical doctor to assist
in evaluating the medical examiner's report (R. at 187-88); a
notice of intent to claim lack of capacity to form intent (R. at
189); and a motion to appoint psychiatrist and expert personnel
to evaluate the effects of voluntary intoxication and alcoholism
on the defendant's ability to "form the specific intent to
commit" the crime (R. at 194). After written response from the
State and argument on the matter in the Cabututan and Cummins
hearings on January 18, the court denied the motions except for
testimony relating to the level of intoxication and the effects
thereof on defendant (R. at 235 and 239-40).

The court

determined that the motions were untimely but that there was good
cause for allowing testimony of the level of intoxication (R. at
239).
Analysis of this issue involves an interplay of several
statutes.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1990) reads:
Voluntary
defense to a
intoxication
mental state
offense[.]

intoxication shall not be a
criminal charge unless such
negates the existence of the
which is an element of the

Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1990) states:
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer
. . . testimony of a mental health expert to
establish mental state, he shall, at the time
of arraignment or as soon afterward as
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days
before the trial, file and serve the
prosecuting attorney with written notice of
his intention to claim the defense.
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Defendant filed a notice of intent to claim lack of
capacity to form the requisite mental state on January 16, 1990
(R. at 189). This was fourteen days after arraignment (R. at
137), and twenty days before trial began (R. at 295). The trial
court determined that this notice was untimely under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-14-3.

This factual determination is fully supported by

the record in this matter and should not be disturbed.

See State

v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (1987).
Defendant argues that he should not "now be asked by
the Court to pay the heavy price of waiver" because of his
counsel's alleged lack of knowledge of the time requirements of
the statute (Br. of App. at 57).

This aspect of the issue and a

harmless error analysis will be addressed in the subsequent
argument concerning the effective assistance of counsel.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR CONTINUANCE.
Regarding a motion to continue trial, the Utah Supreme
Court has said:
It is well established in Utah, as
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance
is at the discretion of the trial judge,
whose decision will not be reversed by this
Court absent a clear abuse of that
discretion. State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d
1093 (1975). Abuse may be found where a
party has made timely objections, given
necessary notice and made a reasonable effort
to have the trial date reset for good cause.
Griffiths v. Hammon, Utah, 560 P.2d 1375
(1977).
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982).

"A serious

lack of preparation might, in some circumstances, have such a
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disadvantageous effect on a defendant's representation as to rise
to a constitutional violation."

State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d

270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

While a denial of a motion to

continue trial to allow more time for preparation may rise to the
level of a violation of the constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel, Heffernan v. Lockhart, 834 F%2d 1431, 1437
(8th Cir. 1987), denial of the motion is not a per se violation.
In a concurring opinion in State v. Gonzales, 641 P,2d 146 (Utah
1982), Justice Howe said:
denial of defendant's motion for a
continuance did not prohibit him from having
effective assistance of counsel. The
granting of a continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v.
Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 1093 (1975). . . %
Defense counsel prepared five motions within
a week of his appointment. He filed a motion
for a bill of particulars on the same day he
entered an appearance, nine days before
trial.
Id. at 147-48 (Howe, J., concurring).

Although Gonzales's

counsel entered an appearance only nine days before trial, the
supreme court determined that the record did not demonstrate that
counsel was ineffective or unprepared.

Id.

Defendant's counsel filed a motion to continue his
trial on January 10, 1990 (R. at 146-48), eight days after
defendant was arraigned (R. at 137), and twenty-fiv§ days before
trial (R. at 295). Counsel had been appointed on the day charges
were filed, October 27, 1989 (R. at 8), and continued as counsel
through trial (R. at 298). In the motion to continue, counsel
complained that there was insufficient time to review all of the
evidence, review the preliminary hearing transcript, interview
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remaining witnesses, allow the investigator to "insure that
weather conditions are appropriately similar to the conditions
existing at the time of the claimed incident," analyze nonspecified fingerprint evidence, and consult with an unnamed
psychiatric expert (R. at 146-48).

The State filed a response on

January 10, claiming that much of the evidence which counsel said
he needed to review had been available to counsel since
defendant's arrest in October 1989.

The trials had been set in a

speedy fashion in order to protect the evidence which would come
from eyewitnesses who were transient in the area.

The tape

recording of the preliminary hearing had been available to
counsel since the time of the hearing and the transcript was
being provided to counsel on January 10 or 11. Witnesses had
been available since October for interviewing by counsel or his
investigator.

Waiting for similar weather conditions for

investigation was a "truly novel" idea.

No indication of the

nature or importance of fingerprint evidence was given.

Finally,

counsel had known of the involvement of alcohol since the
beginning of the case; ample time existed for counsel to have
consulted, or still to consult, with a psychiatric expert (R. at
149-53) .
The court denied the motion on January 11, finding that
counsel had had full access to the county attorney's files, there
had been an extensive preliminary hearing at which counsel had
been able to cross-examine all of the witnesses at length, the
transient nature of the witnesses dictated a speedy trial
setting, and defendant was in custody (R. at 156-57).
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This

denial was not an abuse of discretion.

Counsel had had from

October 27, 1989, to January 11, 1990, to conduct the review and
investigation that he thought crucial.

He also had the remaining

twenty-five days until trial to continue to prepare.

All of the

preparations included in defendant's motion to continue, or in
his brief on appeal, could have been accomplished in the time
between the charging of the crime and the trial.

The trial court

no doubt was aware of this when it denied the motion; that denial
was not an abuse of discretion.
POINT IV
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE TO DEFENDANT.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance on four bases:

1) Counsel failed to file

a timely motion for psychiatric assistance; 2) counsel failed to
adequately prepare; 3) counsel failed to call character
witnesses; and 4) counsel failed to object to prosecutorial
errors.
This Court addressed the issue of effective assistance
of counsel in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), in which it said:
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
. . . (1984), the United States Supreme Court
established the standard for determining
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
at trial. To prevail, the defendant must
demonstrate, first, that counsel's
representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment,
and second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant. Id,, at 690 . . . .
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and
interpreted the Strickland standard for
determining ineffective assistance claims.
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See, e.g., State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah
1986).
746 P.2d at 275 (parallel citations omitted).

Interpreting the

test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Utah
Supreme Court said:
Defendant must prove that specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance.

Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. . . . To be found
sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must
affirmatively show that a "reasonable
probability" exists that, but for counsel's
error, the result would have been different.
We have defined "reasonable probability" as
that sufficient to undermine confidence in
the reliability of the verdict.
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted).
This Court "'need not determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by defendant as
a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . .

If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed.'"

Jd. (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S.

at 697). Applying this test to the present case, defendant has
not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
performance.
A.

Motion for appointment of a psychiatrist.

Defendant first claims that his counsel was deficient
because he failed to file a timely motion for psychiatric
assistance.

The record demonstrates that there was no reasonable
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probability of a different result at trial had counsel filed a
timely motion and a psychiatrist been appointed.

While there was

testimony of the amount defendant had allegedly had to drink, the
defense, based on his own testimony, was that he had not
participated in the beating, not that he had not had the
requisite mental state to commit the crime.

Defendant testified

to punching Ramirez five or six times while they were in the
trailer (Tr. at 475-76).

When Ramirez was being beaten outside

the trailer, defendant claims to have been inside trying to get
Cayer out of the trailer and then to have been chasing Apodaca
(Tr. at 477-81).

His next contact with Ramirez was when he tried

to help him up, keep others from kicking Ramirez, and then
helping Ramirez to his trailer (Tr. at 483-84).

From his own

testimony, his defense was that he did not participate in the
severe beating which lead to Ramirez's death.

In State v.

Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
applied harmless error analysis to Padilla's claim that the trial
court's voluntary intoxication instruction was faulty. .Ici. at
1331-32.

The court found that Padilla had not relied on an

intoxication defense as the theory of his case.

Padilla claimed

at trial that the shooting was accidental; consequently, his
inability to form the requisite mental state was not at issue.
In the present case, as in Padilla. defendant presented evidence
that he had been drinking; however, his own testimony was that he
had not participated in the beating and kicking.

Defendant's

defense was that he did not cause the death, not that he did not
have the requisite mental state. A psychiatrist would not have
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assisted defendant in presenting this defense.
While in the present case there is evidence that
defendant had consumed alcohol, he does not claim that he
"blacked out" or lacks memory of the attack on Ramirez.

In

Padilla, eyewitnesses to Padilla's crime had testified that he
was not incapacitated.

Padilla "himself testified in detail

about the events leading up to the incident, but claimed to have
lost his memory regarding the shooting itself."

.Id., at 1332.

The court said, "This evidence all tends to negate defendant's
position that he was so intoxicated that he 'blacked out' before
and during the time of the shooting."

Id.

In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), the supreme
court addressed an intoxication defense, stating that, "for Wood
to have been successful, he had to prove much more than he had
been drinking.

It was necessary to show that his mind had been

affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to
form the requisite [mental state.]"

.Id. at 90. As in Padilla,

neither Wood nor an eyewitness testified that Wood's "faculties
were impaired" .Id. Nothing in the present case points to a
finding that defendant was so intoxicated that he could not have
formed the requisite mental state.

The eyewitnesses presumed

that defendant was drunk but they did not testify that defendant
had any trouble moving about or participating in the beating.
Defendant shows a clear recollection of his version of what
occurred, which attempts to minimize his own participation, but
which does not show that defendant was not aware of what he was
doing.

Defendant was seen directing the beating administered to
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Ramirez (Tr. at 151-52); he was also seen beating, kicking and
choking Ramirez in conjunction with the other three (Tr. at 116).
Several times during the beating, defendant was heard threatening
to beat and to kill Ramirez (Tr. at 119 and 121). The inferences
from the evidence is that defendant knowingly and intentionally
struck Ramirez, intending to cause serious bodily injury, and
committing acts clearly dangerous to human life, or acted with
depraved indifference to Ramirez's life as he participated in the
beating.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1990).

A psychiatrist

could only have testified from the information presented to him
or her.

From the evidence produced at trial, there was little

evidence that a psychiatrist could have used to determine that
defendant did not have a culpable mental state.

The evidence of

the amount of alcohol consumed came only from defendant himself
and did not comport with the evidence of defendant's lack of
impairment.

The testimony of the eyewitnesses and defendant

himself shows that defendant was not impaired to the point of
negating the requisite mental state.

Since the evidence did not

support a finding that defendant had been intoxicated to the
extent of negating his mental state, a psychiatrist could not
have assisted in establishing that defense.
B.

Adequate preparation and cross-examination.

Defendant next contends that trial counsel did not
adequately prepare for trial, which inadequate preparation caused
him to be deficient in cross-examining the eyewitnesses.
Defendant has failed to provide an adequate record to allow this
Court to address these issues.
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To affirm a reversal of his conviction,
[defendant] must show prejudicial error.
State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267
(1982). Since the record is silent as to why
the motion [] was denied, "we do not presume
either error or prejudice." State v.
Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 239, 419 P.2d 770,
773 (1966). . . .
Since [defendant] has not supplied a trial
transcript on appeal, we are unable to
determine whether [defendant] was [prejudiced
by denial of his motion.] Since there is no
record evidence showing that [defendant] was
prejudiced by a lack of a bill of
particulars, we must assume the regularity of
the proceedings below and affirm the
judgment.
State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985).

Defendant has

not provided a record for his claims that trial counsel failed to
interview witnesses prior to preliminary hearing, to obtain
photographic evidence of the crime scene, to obtain background
information of the victim, and to review the preliminary hearing
transcript and statements of witnesses.

Because defendant has

not carried his burden of proving specific omissions, this Court
should presume "that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised 'reasonable professional judgment.'"

Frame, 723 P.2d

at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
Defendant cites to several instances of alleged
discrepancies between the eyewitnesses' trial testimony and their
pretrial statements and testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Defendant has not provided the preliminary hearing transcript or
the pretrial statements to allow this Court to review the
allegations.

This Court should presume regularity and decline to

address these claims.

State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah

1985).
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Even if the actions or omissions of trial counsel which
defendant challenges were deficient, he has not demonstrated that
he was prejudiced by counsel's performance.

The discrepancies

defendant lists in his brief were minor differences which usually
can be explained by the differences in perception between
different witnesses with different vantage points. Apodaca saw
little of the beating before defendant chased him away (Tr. at
96-98).

Tilley saw only ten to fifteen seconds of the beating

(Tr. at 160). Anderson saw the most, although even he saw only
three-quarters of the fight (Tr. at 133). The discrepancies
defendant points to are consistent with witnesses who saw
different angles and different parts of a single event.

Even if

counsel had pointed out the discrepancies, there is no reasonable
probability that the jury would have returned a different
verdict.

See State v. Wvnia, 754 P.2d 667, 671-72 (Utah Ct.

App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988).
C.

Calling character witnesses.

Defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel
because trial counsel did not call character witnesses "despite
the obvious need for character testimony" (Br. of App. at 72).
He claims that he requested that counsel call character
witnesses, but there is no record of such a request.

Neither

does defendant allege how calling character witnesses would have
resulted in a different verdict at trial.

His failure to

demonstrate prejudice by counsel not calling character witnesses
nullifies his claim.

See Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.
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D.

Objection to alleged prosecutorial errors.

Defendant again fails to demonstrate prejudice in his
claim that trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial
errors.

"It is not enough to claim that the alleged errors had

some conceivable effect of the outcome or could have had a
prejudicial effect of the fact finders.

To be found sufficiently

prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that a 'reasonable
probability' exists that, but for counsel's error, the result
would have been different."

1^.

Defendant's conclusory

assertions that his counsel was deficient and "prejudiced the
trial to such as extent that the verdict cannot be relied upon,"
does not affirmatively show how his trial was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to object.

Failure to demonstrate prejudice

negates defendant's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESPONDED TO THE
QUESTIONS POSED BY THE JURY DURING ITS
DELIBERATIONS.
Defendant maintains that the trial court failed to
provide the guidance that the jury sought when it sent out notes
during its deliberation.

The record shows that trial counsel did

not object to the manner in which the court handled the questions
which the jury posed (Tr. at 671-75).

Trial counsel even

participated in fashioning a response to the questions which
provided the statutory definition of "serious bodily injury" (Tr.
at 672-75 and R. at 300).
"A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
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contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal."
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in
original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)).

Defendant's failure to object to the manner in which the

court responded to the jury's questions waives appellate review
of this issue.
Even if this issue had been preserved for review,
defendant's claim is without merit.
89, 93, n.5 (Utah 1981).

See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d

The record demonstrates that the trial

court did respond to the jury's questions with more than a
"terse[] directfion to the jury] to reread the instructions
already given" (Br. of App. at 74).

The trial court worked with

counsel to prepare a response to the jury which was then given to
the jury in written form (Tr. at 671-75 and R. at 300). As to
other questions which were asked by the jury, the trial court
properly referred the jury back to the instructions which
answered their questions.
In State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981), the supreme
court remanded the case because the trial judge refused to define
the word "genitals" for the jury.

The court noted that the law

regarding responses to jury requests had been changed; however,
that case presented a circumstance "in which, even under the
current statute, the court should 'respond to the inquiry.'"
at 94, n.9.

Id.

The provision regarding jury questions is now found

in rule 17(m), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
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After the jury has retired for
deliberation, if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause,
they shall inform the officer in charge of
them, who shall communicate such request to
the court. The court may then direct that
the jury be brought before the court where,
in the presence of the defendant and both
counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further
instructions shall be given. Such response
shall be recorded. The court may in its
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing
without having the jury brought before the
court, in which case the inquiry and the
response thereto shall be entered in the
record.
In Couch, the supreme court drew from the United States Supreme
Court when it stated:
"Discharge of the jury's responsibility for
drawing appropriate conclusions from the
testimony depended on discharge of the
judge's responsibility to give the jury the
required guidance by a lucid statement of the
relevant legal criteria- When a jury makes
explicit its difficulties a trial judge
should clear them away with concrete
accuracy."
Id. at 94 (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607,
612-13 (1946) (emphasis added in Couch)).

The trial judge must

provide guidance through its instructions on the law.

If the

original instructions provide that guidance, the court may
properly decline to give supplemental instructions.
In Couch, the word about which the jury had a question
was a word "susceptible of differing interpretations, only one of
which is a proper statement of the law"; in that circumstance, an
additional instruction was required.

Couch, 635 P.2d at 94.

Further review of the instructions already given could not have
assisted that jury in arriving at the correct legal
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interpretation of the word.

In the present case, the words about

which the jury had question could be answered by further review
of the original instructions.

The first note referred to

Instruction #15 and asked, "The concluding words 'cause the
result', does 'result' mean death or bodily injury or what?" (R.
between [the notes are unnumbered] 298-99).

Instruction #15

defines culpable mental states using the language of the statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1990).

The judge's response was to

refer the jury to the "language of the charge [they were]
considering" (R. between 298-99).

The jury had been instructed

on the charged offense of second degree murder (R. at 317 and
320-21), on the lesser included offense of manslaughter (R. at
326-27), on negligent homicide (R. at 328), on aggravated assault
(R. at 329-20), and assault (R. at 331). These different
offenses have different culpable mental states. The court
properly referred the jury to the language of whichever offense
they were considering to determine which mental state applied;
from that, they could determine the meaning of the word "result"
in Instruction #15. Given the plethora of offenses the jury was
considering, the court could not be more specific in defining
"result" for the jury.

He could properly refer them to whichever

specific offense instruction they were considering in order to
determine the correct definition of the word in the context of
that offense.
The second note asked, "Do you have to intend to kill
someone to be convicted of second degree murder?"

The court

referred the jury to the culpable mental state described in
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Instruction #2 (R. between 298-99).

That instruction told the

jury that the culpable mental states were either "intending to
cause serious bodily injury to Miguel Ramirez, . . . or acting
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life" (R. at 317). The court's response answered the jury's
question as to the requisite mental state to convict this
defendant of second degree murder.

It was in response to this

question that defense counsel asked for and received the
supplemental instruction defining "serious bodily injury" (Tr. at
671-75 and R. at 300) .
The final question referred to the elements instruction
(R. at 320-21), and asked in apparently geometric terms about the
interplay between the subparagraphs of the instruction (R.
between 298-99).

The jury appeared to be trying to read the

instruction as an equation in which certain subparagraphs added
up to equal another subparagraph.

The jury's attempt to read the

instruction as an equation could not be answered other than to
ask the jury to consider the basic instructions as the>y had been
given them (R. at 299). The court could not tell the jury that
they were reading too much into the instruction, it could only
ask them to look at the instruction again.
The trial court did not ignore the jury's requests for
guidance; instead, the court gave the guidance which it could
properly give.

There is no error in the manner in which the

court responded to the jury's questions.

-48-

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN THE MANNER IN WHICH IT ALLOWED THE JURY TO
DELIBERATE.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the jury to deliberate until 1:20 a.m.
after four days of trial (Br. of App. at 76). This Court, in
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), stated:
While it is well-established that the length
of time a jury may be kept together for
deliberation is discretionary with the trial
judge, he may not coerce the jury into
returning a verdict because this amounts to a
denial of a fair and impartial jury trial and
is therefore, a denial of due process.
Id. at 31 (citing Mills v. Tinslev, 314 F.2d 311, 313 (10th
Cir.), cert, denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963)).

The trial court may

keep a jury together for deliberation as long as the length of
time does not become coercive.

There is not, as defendant seeks,

a specific time limit beyond which the length is automatically
coercive and automatically a denial of due process.
Whether the trial court abuses its discretion by
allowing continued deliberation is based on the facts of a given
case.

In the case cited by defendant, Isom v. State, 481 So.2d

820 (Miss. 1985), the jury had deliberated for over seven hours
when they asked the court to allow them to retire for the
evening.

The court required them to return to deliberation, then

called them back into court to instruct them that they must reach
a decision.

These facts made the length of deliberation

coercive, not the mere fact of the amount of time which had
passed.
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In the present case, the jury retired to deliberate on
the fourth day of trial (R. at 294 and Tr. at 669). The record
demonstrates that the jury sent three notes to the court for
clarification of the instructions (R. between 298-99 and Tr. at
671-75).

There is nothing in the record regarding any request by

the jury to retire from deliberation.

There is no hint of

coercion by the court to force the jury to continue deliberations
beyond a request to cease.

Defendant has not and cannot point to

any record support for an assertion that the court coerced the
jury into reaching a decision by prolonging their deliberation.
Defendant asks this Court to presume that the length of
time must have caused the jury to be less alert, and to assume
that some jurors were forced to continue by others who "wanted to
get the job over and done with at the expense of the Appellant"
(Br, of App. at 76). Nothing in the record supports these
conclusions; in fact, the opposite is demonstrated by the record.
The notes sent to the court by the jury during deliberation are
evidence that the jurors were giving careful thought to the
evidence and instructions which they had been given.

The jurors

were polled as to whether the verdict was each of theirs
individually and they answered in the affirmative (Tr. at 67576).

Defendant received his constitutional right to the

"considered judgment of each juror" (Br. of App. at 76).
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE.
Defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to
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let the jury view the scene of the crime/

Once again,

defendant's claim lacks merit.
Rule 17(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
the guideline for permitting a jury to visit a crime scene:
When in the opinion of the court it is
proper for the jury to view the place in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material
fact occurred, it may order them to be
conducted in a body under the charge of an
officer to the place, which shall be shown to
them by some person appointed by the court
for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn
that while the jury are thus conducted, he
will suffer no person other than the person
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so
himself on any subject connected with the
trial and to return them into court without
unnecessary delay or at a specified time.
The decision to allow jurors to view a crime scene lies in the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned
unless the trial court "palpably" abuses its discretion.

See

State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 746 (1945).

Other

states have adopted a similar standard.

State v. Maurof 159

Ariz. 186, 766 P.2d 59, 77 (1986); People v. Cisneros, 720 P.2d
982, 984 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986);
State v. Stoudamire, 30 Wash. App. 41, 631 P.2d 1028, 1031
(1981).
In the instant case, defendant has not demonstrated how
he was prejudiced by the lower court's refusal to allow the jury
to visit the crime scene.

He merely concludes that the evidence

is weak and that viewing the scene would have helped the jury
A

Since defendant provides no legal analysis or authority
for his claim, this Court may refuse to consider the issue.
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
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POINT VIII
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT
APPLY TO THIS MATTER EECAUSE THE CLAIMS
RAISED BY DEFENDANT EITHER WERE NOT ERROR OR
WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Defendant's final point is that if none of the errors
he alleges were reversible errors, their cumulative impact
constituted reversible error. A similar argument was rejected in
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-502 (Utah 1986), when the
supreme court held that the cumulative error doctrine does not
apply when no substantial errors were committed.

As argued

above, the errors claimed by defendant either were not errors at
all or were not prejudicial; consequently, taken together they do
not constitute cumulative reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

3-

day of April, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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